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This study confirms that liquidity is a significant determinant of Canadian corporate 
investment. Contrary to recent U.S. evidence, the investment-liquidity sensitivity of 
financially constrained firms is not found to be significantly different from that of 
unconstrained firms. This is attributed to the industry structure and closely held nature of 







Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) and a number of subsequent empirical studies 
provide strong support for the existence of a direct relationship between internal fund availability 
and firm investment2. The majority of these studies have found the investment decisions of firms 
that are more financially constrained to be more sensitive to firm liquidity than those of less 
constrained firms. Recent studies by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), and Cleary (1999) examine 
firm level data for U.S. companies and find that the investment decisions of firms with greater 
creditworthiness according to traditional financial ratios are the most sensitive to the availability 
of internal cash flows. This seems to contradict previous results, if we accept firm financial status 
as a measure of financial constraint.  
 
This study examines the investment behavior of 201 Canadian firms over the 1988-94 
period. The results confirm the sensitivity of investment decisions to firm liquidity for Canadian 
firms over this sample period, which is consistent with previous empirical studies, and extends 
the Canadian evidence provided by Schaller (1993), who examined 212 Canadian firms over the 
1973-86 period. Results suggest that partially constrained and financially constrained firms are 
more sensitive to liquidity than unconstrained firms. This does not support the conclusions of 
Kaplan and Zingales (hereafter KZ) or Cleary (1999), who both used U.S. samples. The 
difference from U.S. results is attributed to the industry structure and closely held nature of 
Canadian firms, although the Canadian evidence is inconclusive. In particular, regression results 
demonstrate the behavior of a relatively small number of firms in a sample can have a significant 
impact on overall conclusions, which highlights the importance of obtaining large sample 
1 I am grateful to Laurence Booth, Glenn Hubbard, Donald Brean, Varouj Aivazian and Raymond Kan for 
their general comments. I am also especially grateful to an anonymous reviewer at the Canadian Journal of 
Administrative Sciences whose comments lead to substantial improvements All errors are the responsibility 
of the author. 
2 There are numerous other examples including studies by Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) and 
Whited (1992). For an extensive review of this literature, refer to Hubbard (1998). 
                                                          
 
evidence. This is an important observation, since the conclusions of several previous studies are 




Data and Methodology 
 
 
 The sample includes annual data for 201 Canadian corporations over the 1988-94 period 
obtained from the SEC Disclosure Worldscope Database. The sample contains both 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing companies from a variety of industries including: 52 
agricultural, mining, resource and forestry companies; 98 industrial manufacturing companies; 37 
retail and wholesale companies; and 14 service companies. Summary statistics for the entire 
sample are found in Table 1. 
 
This study focuses on financial status, as measured by financial statement variables, using 
the classification scheme of Cleary (1999). The index used to classify firm financial status is 
determined using multiple discriminant analysis, similar to Altman's Z factor for predicting 
bankruptcy4. Discriminant analysis examines an entire profile of characteristics common to a 
group of firms, as well as the interaction of these properties, and transforms them into a univariate 
statistic. This allows the analysis of the entire variable profile of a firm simultaneously, rather 
than sequentially examining the individual characteristics. 
 
In order to use discriminant analysis to determine financial constraint status, I establish 
two mutually exclusive groups by making use of knowledge that firms do not like to cut 
dividends and are hesitant to increase them unless they can be maintained. Accordingly, the 
sample is divided into three categories: group 1 firms that increase dividends and are likely not 
financially constrained; group 2 firms that cut dividends and are likely financially constrained; 
and group 3 firms that do not change dividend payments. Group 3 firms are not utilized for 
purposes of the discriminant analysis, however, they are assigned discriminant (Z) scores and are 
used in the subsequent regression analysis. This group of firms represents a significant proportion 
of the sample (58 percent), and they can be categorized by reference to their discriminant score as 
those that ‘fit the profile’ of constrained or unconstrained firms, which enables the use of an 
increased sample size. 
 
Summary statistics reported in Table 1 confirm that firms reducing dividends appear to 
be more financially constrained according to traditional financial ratios. Firms that cut dividends 
exhibit lower current ratios, higher debt ratios, lower fixed charge coverage, lower net income 
margins, lower market-to-book ratios, lower sales growth, and have lower SLACK/K values than 
firms which increased dividends. The standard ratio performance for firms that did not increase or 
decrease dividend payments, was between the other two groups. Panel B of Table 1 indicates 
substantial changes in the number of firms that increase and decrease dividends through the years. 
The largest number of firms increasing dividends (89) occurred in the pre-recessionary year of 
1988, while the largest number of firms cutting dividends (60) occurred in 1991. This confirms 
that firm financial status changes in response to business cycles, and suggests there are benefits 
associated with reclassifying firm status every period. 
3  For example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) have only 49 firms in one group and only 39 in 
another.  Kaplan and Zingales (1997) use three groups of 19, 22 and 8 firms, while Hoshi, Kashyap and 
Scharfstein (1991) have only 24 firms in their group of constrained firms.  
4 Refer to Altman (1968). 




Summary Statistics (1988-94) 
 
Panel A  - Selected Financial Ratio Means (1988-94)  
 Total Sample Dividend Group 1 
(increased dividend 
per share)  
Dividend Group 2 
(decreased dividend 
per share) 
Dividend Group 3 
(no change in 
dividend per share) 
Net Fixed 
Assets (K) 
$762m $820m $1012 $668m 
Current Ratio 
 
2.23 2.24 1.88 2.32 
Debt/Total 
Assets 
0.27 0.23 0.30 0.28 
Fixed Charge 
Coverage 
9.8 11.8 6.5 9.8 
Net Income 
Margin (%) 
3.5 7.0 0.8 2.6 
Market-to-
Book Ratio 
1.35 1.50 1.18 1.33 
Sales Growth 
(%) 
12.8 15.9 4.7 13.5 
Slack/K 
 
0.76 1.01 0.84 0.63 
(Cash Flow 
+Cash)/K 
0.32 0.49 0.19 0.27 
Investment/K 
 
0.20 0.23 0.16 0.20 
Discriminant 
Score (Z) 
-0.02 0.25 -0.42 -0.17 
 
Panel B - Number of Firms per Dividend Group 
Dividend Group 1988-94 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
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The following beginning of period variables are used to estimate the discriminant 
function: current ratio, debt ratio, fixed charge coverage (FCCov), net income margin (NI%), 
sales growth, and SLACK/K. Coefficient values are estimated for the independent variable in 
order to distinguish between the two groups according to the following FCZ  value:  
 
)1(.%/ 654321 DebtGrowthSalesNIKSLACKFCCovCurrentZ FC ββββββ +++++=   
 
Univariate significance levels indicate net income margin, sales growth, and debt ratio 
are all significant at the one percent significance level, while current ratio and fixed charge 
coverage are significant at the 13 percent and 11 percent levels. The variables do a good job of 
successfully predicting which firms will cut or increase dividends, with group 1 and group 2 firms 
being properly classified 64 percent of the time, however this success rate is well below the 76 
percent rate documented by Cleary (1999). There are several reasons that likely account for this 
 
difference, the most obvious being the much smaller sample size used in the present study. 
Another reason is the different nature of the samples. In particular, the Canadian sample is much 
more heterogeneous than the U.S. one, consisting of only 48 percent manufacturing companies 
versus 64 percent in the U.S. sample, and 26 percent resource-based companies versus a mere 7.5 






Selected Financial Ratio Means (1988-94) 
 
All financial variables are for the beginning of the fiscal year, except for cash flow and investment, which 
represent firm cash flow and capital expenditures during period ‘t’.  
 


















Net Fixed Assets 
(K) 
$729m $797m $626m $1000m $659m 
Current Ratio 
 
1.78 2.67 1.77 1.86 3.07 
Debt/Total Assets 
 
0.38 0.17 0.42 0.26 0.14 
Fixed Charge 
Coverage  
7.0 12.8 6.5 8.1 15.0 
Net Income Margin 
(%) 
-2.5 9.3 -5.1 3.7 11.8 
Market-to-Book 
Ratio 
1.17 1.53 1.15 1.24 1.67 
Sales Growth 
(%) 
2.8 22.7 0.8 6.8 30.7 
Slack/K 
 
0.70 0.82 0.69 0.73 0.86 
(Cash 
Flow+Cash)/K 
0.23 0.36 0.20 0.31 0.44 
Investment / K 
 
0.16 0.24 0.15 0.20 0.26 
Discriminant 
Score (Z) 
-0.89 0.68 -1.20 -0.10 1.00 
 
 
Discriminant analysis differentiates best between firms when they are homogeneous in 
nature with respect to variables other than those being examined, and therefore it is logical that it 
would perform better for more homogeneous samples. This implies that better results would be 
obtained by performing discriminant analysis on firms within industry categories, and that turns 
out to be the case. When the sample is divided into three industry groups according to their SIC 
codes, the overall success rates in predicting which firms will change their dividends increase 
substantially. In particular, the following success rates are achieved for the industry groups: 67 
percent for the group of 52 resource-based firms; 73 percent for the group of 98 manufacturing 
5 It may also be partially attributable to differences in dividend behavior between Canadian and U.S. 
managers, although this hypothesis is not explored in this study. 
                                                          
 
firms; and 71 percent for the group of 51 firms categorized as retail and wholesale firms, or 
service firms.  
 
Firms are allocated to groups every year, according to their discriminant score ( FCZ )
6. 
This allows firm classification to change every period to reflect the fact that financial status 
changes continuously. Every year, the 100 firms with the highest Z scores are assigned to the not 
financially constrained (NFC100) group, while the ones with the 100 lowest values are assigned 
to the financially constrained (FC100) group. In order to account for any significant differences in 
the financial constraint status of firms ranked close to the median, this procedure is repeated to 
form three groups instead of two. Each year, I assign firms with the top 67 discriminant scores to 
the not financially constrained (NFC67) group, firms with the bottom 67 discriminant scores to 
the financially constrained (FC67) group, and the remaining firms to the partially constrained 
(PFC67) group. Table 2 displays summary statistics for these groups that confirm the 
effectiveness of this approach in capturing desired cross-sectional properties. The financial status 
of the NFC100 firms is far superior to that of the FC100 group, while the NFC67 firms are 
superior to the PFC67 firms, and the FC67 firms appear more constrained than both the PFC67 
and NFC67 firms. 
 
I use a variation of the basic regression equation used by most previous studies including 
FHP88 and KZ to examine investment-liquidity sensitivity: 
 
)2(.)/)(()/()/( // ititKCFitBMitit KCashCFBMKI εββα ++++=
 
I represents investment in plant and equipment during period t, K is the beginning of period book 
value for net property, plant, and equipment, (CF+Cash) represents current period cash flow to 
the firm (as measured by net income plus depreciation plus the change in deferred taxes) plus the 
beginning-of-period balances of cash plus short-term securities; and M/B represents the firm’s 
market-to-book ratio for total assets, based on the previous year's market value at year end.  
 
The market-to-book to ratio is used to proxy for growth opportunities, while 
(CF+Cash)/K is used to proxy for firm liquidity. The equation is estimated using fixed effects to 
account for unobserved relationships between investment and the independent variables, and to 
capture business-cycle influences, which is consistent with previous studies. Results are reported 
for the ‘demeaned’ or ‘within’ fixed firm and year estimates, which coincides with estimates 
presented by FHP88 and KZ.  
 
Empirical p-values are determined using the bootstrap methodology described in Cleary 
(1999) in order to determine the significance levels of observed differences in coefficient 
estimates. The regression results highlight the benefit of calculating empirical values, since some 
rather large differences in coefficient estimates are found to be insignificant, contrary to what 




6 I use the discriminant scores obtained using the entire sample (despite the lower success rate), not those 
obtained within industry groups. This is because the values determined within industry groups are relative 









Regression results presented in Table 3 indicate that liquidity and market-to-book are 
both significant determinants of investment (at the one percent level) for the entire sample of 201 
firms, with estimated coefficients of 0.098 and 0.028 respectively. These values differ somewhat 
from those of Schaller (1993), who obtained fixed effects estimates of 0.242 and 0.007 for CF/K 
and Tobin’s q. This may be attributable to the different time periods being examined, as well as 
the use of different proxies for growth opportunities and liquidity. The estimates are much closer 
to the estimates of 0.043 for Tobin’s q and 0.058 for CF/K that are obtained by Cummins, Hassett 
and Hubbard (1996) for the Canadian firms they examine over the 1982-1992 period.  
  
Table 3 presents regression evidence for the two groups (NFC100 and FC100) that are 
formed by dividing the sample in half according to the classification scheme described in the 
previous section. The estimated liquidity coefficient is positive and significant for both groups, 
however, it is almost four times as large for the financially constrained group (0.197 versus 
0.050). This evidence appears to support the conclusions of previous studies that investment is 
more closely related to liquidity for firms facing greater levels of financial constraints. However, 
the empirical p-value of 0.0666 suggests the difference in coefficient estimates is only significant 
at the 6.66 percent level, which is not as conclusive as one might expect, given the magnitude of 
the difference. 
 
One would expect to observe even greater differences in liquidity coefficient estimates 
between the unconstrained and constrained groups (NFC67 and FC67) when the sample is 
divided into three groups, since this classification approach places greater emphasis on firms 
ranked at either extreme of the sample. The results for the NFC67 group are virtually identical to 
those for the NFC100 group, however, the estimates for the FC67 group change quite 
dramatically from those for the FC100 group. The liquidity coefficient for the FC67 group falls to 
0.100 from 0.197. The empirical p-value suggests the difference in liquidity coefficient estimates 
between the NFC67 and FC67 groups is only significant at the 27 percent level. 
  
The reason for this surprising turn of events becomes obvious when we examine the 
results for the PFC67 group. The estimated liquidity coefficient for this group is 0.267, which is 
2.67 times the FC67 group estimate and more than five times the NFC67 group estimate. 
Apparently, the results for the FC100 group are driven to a large extent by observations for some 
firms ranked between 100 and 133 according to their discriminant scores. Under the alternative 
grouping mechanism, these firms are classified in the PFC67 group and produce some 
unanticipated results. The empirical p-value indicates the observed difference in liquidity 
coefficient estimates between the PFC67 group and the NFC67 group is significant at the 3.90 
percent level. However, despite a relatively large difference in liquidity coefficient estimates 
between the PFC67 and FC67 groups, the difference is insignificant.   
 
The results demonstrate the importance of having an adequate number of firms in a group 
for comparison purposes, since the behavior of a few firms can have a significant effect on 
overall conclusions. They also demonstrate the usefulness of determining empirical p-values, 
because we observe some rather large differences in coefficient estimates to be insignificant, 
contrary to what one might expect. These observations withstand a number of robustness tests 
including alternative regression estimation techniques, and the elimination of extreme 





Regression Estimates for the Total Sample   
 
Reported coefficients are the ‘within’ fixed firm and year estimates over the 1988-94 sample period. T-
statistics are in parentheses.  Capital expenditures divided by net fixed assets is the dependent variable. P-
values in bold indicate a significant difference in coefficient estimates at the 5% level.  
 





















0.053 (2.88) 0.197 (11.80) 17.65% 700 
NFC100 firms 
 
0.014 (1.17) 0.050 (4.10) 2.29% 700 
FC67 firms 
 
0.056 (3.86) 0.100 (6.84) 11.32% 469 
PFC67 firms 
 
0.055 (1.88) 0.267 (9.90) 18.40% 469 
NFC67 firms 
 
0.005 (0.34) 0.052 (3.77) 2.58% 469 
Empirical P-values 
 
    
FC100 versus 
NFC100 
0.2280 0.0666   
FC67 versus PFC67 
 
0.4890 0.7890   
FC67 versus NFC67 
 
0.1680 0.2672   
PFC67 versus NFC 
 
0.1886 0.0390   
 
 
As mentioned previously, there are substantial differences in the nature of the sample 
used in this study and those used in many previous studies that are primarily due to the distinct 
nature of the Canadian economy. I now examine if sample differences account for the differences 
in my results from those of previous studies, with particular emphasis on the Cleary (1999) 
results, which were obtained using the same methodology. Aside from sample size, two of the 
most important sample differences are industry structure and ownership structure. In particular, 
Canada relies more heavily on resource based industries than many other developed economies, 
and Canadian firms tend to be much more closely held than their U.S. counterparts. 
 
Ownership groups were formed according to ownership structure based on the largest 
percentage of the firm’s common shares owned by any given shareholder as of December 31, 
1991 (the mid-way point of the sample horizon). Ownership Group A (Own A) consists of firms 
with no single shareholder owning more than 20 percent of the firm’s outstanding shares and can 
be considered widely held. Ownership Group B (Own B) consists of firms where the largest 
single shareholder owns between 20 and 50 percent of the firm’s shares. Ownership Group C 
(own C) consists of firms where the largest single shareholder owns more than 50 percent of the 
firm’s shares.  
 
 
I was able to find ownership data for 196 of 201 firms in total, and the sample was found 
to consist of 42 (21 percent) Own A firms, 72 Own B firms (36 percent), and 82 (41 percent) 
Own C firms. This implies that only about 1 in 5 firms was widely held. While comparable 
statistics are not available from previous U.S. studies, it is reasonable to assume they would 
consist of a much higher proportion of widely held firms since most of the samples consisted 
entirely or to a large extent of NYSE-listed firms, which tend to be widely held.  
  
Regression results are presented for these ownership groups in Table 4, which suggest 
that widely held firms (Own A) are more sensitive to liquidity than both other groups. The 
liquidity coefficient for the Own A group of 0.238 is almost four times as large as the coefficient 
for the Own C group (0.060), and the difference is significant at the 4.26 percent level. However, 
despite being almost three times as large as the Own B group coefficient of 0.084, the difference 
is only significant at the 17 percent level. These observations conform to expectations, since they 
are consistent with the existence of a smaller wedge between the cost of internal and external 
finance due to lower informational asymmetry problems that would be attributed to more closely 
held firms. As a result, we would expect these firms to be less sensitive to internal fund 
availability than widely held firms. The results also support those of Schaller (1993) who found 
that firms with wider ownership concentration (<50%) were more than twice as sensitive to 
liquidity (with a cash flow coefficient of 0.366) than those with concentrated ownership (0.154). 
 
Firms are also categorized into three industry groups according to their SIC codes as 
described previously, and the regression results for these groups are presented in Table 4. A 
priori, one would expect resource firms to be less sensitive to liquidity and market-to-book ratios 
than other firms, with investment decisions being driven by factors such as successful exploration 
ventures and/or commodity prices. This was found to be the case, as demonstrated in Table 6, 
where we observe an insignificant coefficient for market-to-book, and a relatively small liquidity 
coefficient of 0.037, although it is significant. The liquidity coefficients for the other two industry 
groups are much higher: manufacturing firm group (0.163); and retail/wholesale and retailing 
firm group (0.146). The difference between the liquidity coefficients of the resource and 
manufacturing firms is significant at the 2.62 percent level. However, despite the fact that the 
liquidity coefficient retail/wholesale and service group is almost four times that of that for the 
resource group, the difference is only significant at the 15.26 percent level. Once again the overall 
results are consistent with the results of Schaller (1993), who found that manufacturing firms had 
much higher liquidity coefficients than non-manufacturing firms (0.597 versus 0.168), although 
he does not further refine his sample to identify resource based firms.   
 
In summary, it appears quite likely that the distinct characteristics of the present sample 
contribute to the unique results. In particular, resource and closely held firms are less sensitive to 
liquidity than manufacturing and widely held firms, and this sample contains a higher proportion 





7 I also considered the impact on the overall results of applying the classification approach described above 
to a given industry group. The emerging patterns within these groups supported the overall results for the 
manufacturing group, and to a lesser extent for the retail/wholesale and service group, while they are 
inconclusive for the resource group.  
 




Regression Estimates for Ownership and Industry Groups   
 
Reported coefficients are the ‘within’ fixed firm and year estimates over the 1988-94 sample period. T-statistics are in 
parentheses.  Capital expenditures divided by net fixed assets is the dependent variable. P-values in bold indicate a 
significant difference in coefficient estimates at the 5% level.  
 






Regression Estimates  
 
Ownership Group A 
(Own A) 
0.095 (6.49) 0.238 (6.81) 26.44% 294 
Ownership Group B 
(Own B) 
-0.008 (-0.51) 0.084 (4.97) 4.42% 504 
Ownership Group C 
(Own C) 
0.083 (4.57) 0.060 (4.23) 6.84% 574 
SIC 1-1999 – 
Resource Firms 
(SIC1) 
0.009 (0.60) 0.037 (2.44) 1.13% 364 
SIC 2000-3999 – 
Manufacturing Firms 
(SIC2) 
0.003 (0.25) 0.163 (5.97) 5.82% 686 
SIC Codes 5000-








    
Own A versus Own B 
 
0.0448 0.1698   
Own A versus Own C 
 
0.3754 0.0426   
Own B versus Own C 
 
0.9678 0.4098   
SIC1 versus SIC2 
 
0.4444 0.9738   
SIC1 versus SIC3&4 
 
0.7976 0.8474   
SIC2 versus SIC3&4 
 






Contrary to recent U.S. evidence provided by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), and Cleary 
(1999), the investment-liquidity sensitivity of financially constrained firms is not found to be 
significantly lower that of unconstrained firms. Surprisingly, partially constrained firms exhibit 
higher investment-liquidity sensitivity than both constrained and unconstrained firms.  
 
 
An obvious reason for the differences in results from the U.S. studies is the nature of the 
companies included in the Canadian sample. The present sample contains a lower proportion of 
manufacturing firms and higher proportion of resource-based companies than the U.S. studies. 
This is important in light of evidence that resource firms are less sensitive to liquidity than other 
non-manufacturing firms and than manufacturing firms. Ownership structure is also an important 
consideration since Canadian companies tend to be closely held relative to U.S. companies, which 
is the case in this sample where close to 80 percent of the firms had a major shareholder that 
owned more than 20 percent of its outstanding common shares. The results suggest that the 
investment outlays of widely held firms are more sensitive to liquidity, than for more closely held 
firms, which is consistent with previous Canadian evidence.   
 
Aside from the industry and ownership structure effects described above, another 
important difference between this sample and the Cleary (1999) sample, is sample size. This 
study highlights the importance of this matter by demonstrating how sensitive the results can be 
to the behavior of a small number of firms. This represents an important observation, since the 
conclusions of several previous studies are based on small sample results. The implication of 
these results is that large sample evidence is necessary to obtain insight into the nature of the 
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